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Jamie’s School Dinners (2005) has been credited1 with starting a campaign that influenced school food 
policy. As an output of Channel 4, a celebrity vehicle and an example of the Lifestyle genre, Jamie’s 
School Dinners offers a pertinent case study to address the meaning of public service television in a 
global context. In addition to elucidating a number of contemporary issues around the status and 
meaning of public service principles in an increasingly international market, it also speaks to notions of 
genre, address, policy and celebrity that have emerged as underpinning facets of popular culture. In 
what follows, we trace a number of these tensions, uncovering the program’s address through textual 
analysis, and locating it within the broader histories of public service broadcasting and the Lifestyle 
genre. 
Jamie’s School Dinners could be claimed by Channel 4 to be part of its public service remit, informing, 
educating and entertaining its audience. Like most of Channel 4’s output, the series was produced by an 
independent production company (in this case, Fresh One Productions, owned by Oliver) and created as 
a product for international exploitation. The series was remade in the US as Jamie’s (American) Food 
Revolution (ABC, 2010-11), where its emphasis on public service sat less comfortably, largely as a result 
of the specific US context. Here, it was classed as reality TV rather than as documentary and was clearly 
commercial in nature, being re-commissioned for a second season (even if it was dropped before all 
episodes were shown). The commercial nature of the program was doubly apparent when it was re-
imported to the UK. Here, the US transformation undermined many of the public service values of the 
original series. This process highlights a significant problem for public service broadcasters across the 
globe: as receipts from licence fees and advertising are dwindling due to channel proliferation, audience 
fragmentation, and the wide-spread acceptance of neoliberalism as common sense ideology,2 
broadcasters and producers alike are increasingly dependent on the international exploitation of their 
content. The UK independent market has been particularly successful in this respect in relation to the 
format trade.3 However, this sits uneasily with the broadcaster’s public service commitments, 
particularly when the programs are more political in nature. More importantly for us, it indicates that 
“the public” is still defined along national lines despite the increased internationalisation of both the 
television market and public policy. 
 
Public Service Broadcasting in the UK  
British broadcasting has operated within the system of public service practically since its inception in the 
early 1920s. The BBC, for example, initially set up as a private company, soon moved into the public 
sector. This process, which included reports from two committees, also defined the parameters of public 
service broadcasting.4  Indeed, the earliest definition, offered by the Sykes Committee in advance of the 
Crawford Committee (1925), proclaimed that broadcasting should be a public utility and serve the public 
interest.5 John Reith, invited to contribute to the Crawford Committee, extended this notion, arguing 
that broadcasting should not only “educate, inform and entertain”, but that it could – and should –make 
“the nation as one man.”6 Such an image emerged from the recognition of class divisions in British 
society, which a mixed program could be scheduled to breach.7 Consequently, schedules were designed 
with two aims in mind: to share culture and interests of different sections of society through an inclusive 
approach that was designed with an emphasis on showcasing the best of human knowledge; and to 
bring important elements of British social and political life to the airwaves so that people who had 
traditionally been excluded (due to class, gender or location, for example) were included. As Scannell 
convincingly argues, this defined a general (national) public for the first time in British history.8 
When we compare this history with the US, which opted for a commercial system, a further issue 
becomes apparent. Michele Hilmes9 highlights that notions of the “public good” were also featured in 
discourses about broadcasting in the US where it meant something decidedly different. There, “public 
good” was initially understood as an opportunity for organisations to directly partake in the broadcast.10 
The emphasis was on the ability to speak via the creation and dissemination of content rather than (as 
with the UK) the ability to access  broadcasted content. This crucial difference, which emphasised a 
plurality of voices in terms of control over spectrum (US) rather than in terms of varied content (UK)11 
goes some way to explaining not only the differences in contemporary broadcasting, but also mode of 
address within programs. Indeed, the embedded assumption that variety of producers (rather than 
varied content) automatically caters for a diverse population works to construct the audience and the 
public in particular ways:  not only is the audience/public constructed as more enterprising in spirit, but 
this enterprise is written along liberal, business driven models that, arguably, defines American public 
life more generally. In contrast, the British version of “the public good” assumes the need for a 
paternalistic role of the (upper middle-class led) state,12 which knows what is best for the nation as a 
whole. The comparison with the US thus reveals that the BBC constructed the audience in ways that 
suggested their inherent passivity and separation from the broadcaster. In turn, the British broadcaster 
is the active benefactor that designs its schedule to offer deliberate variety of high and low cultural 
elements enjoyed by different sections of the audience. The public, then, is perceived as receiving – as 
consumers - even if that is of material for public consumption.13  
Such a definition of the British public as receiving rather than participating in broadcasting remained 
central for the best part of 70 years, even as “the public” and “public service broadcasting” were 
continuously redefined. While we don’t have the scope to enter into a detailed history, one crucial 
redefinition is worth noting. This relates to changes brought into the system as a result of the 1986 
Peacock Report.14  As Scannell details, the Report took an alternative approach to broadcasting and in 
the process altered the language used to speak about broadcasting for the foreseeable future. Where 
previous reports had thought of broadcasting as a utility and public service, Peacock saw in it a 
commercial entity.  In this process, he also re-defined audiences from a national public to private 
consumers which meant that broadcasting in the UK should become more focused on the individual and 
that broadcasting itself should move away from providing a service to becoming a commodity. As 
several writers15 have argued, this resulted in the wholesale commercialisation of British television, 
where public service broadcasting was an optional add-on, reduced in definition to specific programs. As 
Holland16 argues, this undermined the construction of public service broadcasting as a system, which 
recognised viewers and listeners as citizens coming together as national, regional, or other specific, 
publics. In other words, Peacock’s recommendations were largely in line with the neoliberal ideology 
Margaret Thatcher’s and later governments embraced, where the emphasis was on the positive impact 
of the market and the “active” consumers-as-individuals. 
A further change worth noting was the increased introduction of digital technologies to broadcasting, 
which also facilitated a redefinition of the public. These technologies were understood to provide 
audiences with greater access to two-way communication, and hence would enable them to shape 
broadcast content themselves. This is particularly evident in the policy decisions taken by the Blair 
Government, which aimed to use these technologies to “ameliorate the ‘digital divide’ as a means of 
combating social exclusion and political apathy”.17 While the audience’s ability to shape broadcast 
content had been part of public service broadcasting long before the Blair Government, the 1990s saw 
concerted efforts, particularly by the BBC and Channel 4, to involve audiences in the making of 
programs, as the BBC’s ambitious Video Nation project (in different formats, since 1993) indicated. This 
participatory approach, also evident in Channel 4’s 4 Thought series, redefines the public in much more 
traditional ways as participating in a Habermasian public sphere and in so doing re-evokes a masculine-
defined sphere of politics while undermining other aspects of the public that broadcasting in the UK, 
particularly in its early forms on the BBC and later on Channel 4, had explicitly included.  
Public service broadcasting in Britain, then, had been transformed significantly by the early 2000s. By 
then, it was clear that it was no longer a public utility, meant to be accessible by all, bringing the nation 
together as a general public. Rather, the national public, if it still existed, was now understood to consist 
of consuming individuals who might participate – if that was their choice, to use another neoliberal 
watchword – in a masculine-defined public sphere of politics and social policy. The need to engage with 
each other’s culture, to be educated and informed, to be represented in diverse ways, and most 
importantly to be brought together as one was increasingly perceived as archaic. 
 
Channel 4 and Lifestyle Programming 
Choice, the individual, and consumerism are some of the key underlying ideologies of contemporary 
broadcasting, written not only into scheduling and the availability of different channels, but also into the 
modes of address, and the discourses and representation of key characters of the programs themselves. 
Indeed, it is clear when we consider the wider socioeconomic and political contexts that these ideologies 
have been central not just to broadcasting, but also to popular culture, politics, civic life, and the 
economy more generally. As Angela McRobbie has argued, drawing on Giddens18 and Beck,19 neoliberal 
consumerist identities are part of a longer and wider shift working to construct the individual as 
discerning, self-monitoring agent.20  
In relation to broadcast content, our suggestion is that the Lifestyle genre and the 8pm slot for Channel 
4’s schedule can be read as exemplary of these ideologies, and it is in their wider context that Jamie’s 
School Dinners is located. In what follows, we discuss the generic traits of the Lifestyle genre, particularly 
in relation to the ideologies of individualism, neoliberalism and choice, before specifically focusing on 
Jamie’s School Dinners, which, by comparison with its contemporaries, claimed, at least overtly, to be 
more than the others. 
Lifestyle has become a central feature for the evening line-up of Channel 4. It attracts a young middle-
class audience which, as a result of its particular make-up (of reasonably affluent, cultured/educated, 
independent consumers), returns significant advertising revenue for the channel.21  Following early 
successes in the 1990s, Lifestyle is now a hallmark of the 8-9pm slot on weekdays for Channel 4, where 
it is a lucrative genre also for the production companies that produce and subsequently franchise their 
formats for sales across the world. 
Despite its contemporary status in a prime time slot, the Lifestyle genre has a longer history - one that 
saw it originally as a predominantly daytime, female-oriented genre, aimed at housewives and 
mothers.22  Since 1990, however, the genre has undergone some changes, the most obvious being the 
shift from daytime to evening scheduling, which has necessitated further alterations in relation to 
content, mode of address and style. Charlotte Brunsdon23 and Rachel Moseley24 have both discussed 
these changes in relation to gender, and it is worth noting these briefly here.  For Brunsdon, the change 
in scheduling is seen as an overall feminisation of British television in that period because on a broad 
level, genres perceived as feminine were now being seen in the evening slot, which was previously 
dominated by genres traditionally considered masculine (documentary and political chat shows)25 or 
aimed at the whole family (variety programs).  Moseley has suggested, on the other hand, that the 
alteration in scheduling resulted in a “masculinisation” of the genre26 which has worked to establish it as 
“gender-neutral” over the past two decades.27 This process, of course, is built on the notion that the 
Lifestyle genre in its original form was problematic for the coveted demographic described above. The 
consequence, we suggest in keeping with Moseley, was a convoluted and complex process of 
“masculinisation” that has actually worked to promote ideologies of neoliberalism, individualism and 
capitalism as the shared cross-gender cultural values.  What is notable from Moseley and Brunsdon’s 
analysis is the interrelation of content and time-slot when thinking about gender and gendered address.  
The masculine address was overtly achieved by including an increasing array of bloke-y characters such 
as “Handy” Andy Kane, the carpenter on Changing Rooms (BBC 1996-2004), Gordon Ramsay who gained 
notoriety for his swearing, or indeed the “new lad” Jamie Oliver. Such characters also work as celebrities 
– unique individuals who are constructed as such (rather than, for example, as characters), which, in 
turn, underpins notions of individualisation, celebrity and neoliberalism, not least because in many 
cases, the centring of such characters also enhanced their careers. In addition, there was an increased 
emphasis on elements traditionally considered masculine, particularly the notion of competition,28 
evident in Masterchef (BBC, since 1990) or Changing Rooms and utilised in Hell’s Kitchen (2005), and 
Sarah Beeny’s Selling Houses (More4, since 2012).  Moreover, these programs included the notion of 
self-improvement as a central driving force behind participation. This notion, as theorists29 have argued, 
is connected to a discourse that emphasises a middle-class sensibility and is directed at the neoliberal 
individual in control of “his” own destiny via the avenue of consumption. In other words, these 
programs relied on an address to a subject that looked increasingly like a (metrosexual) spin on the 
traditional Cartesian (masculine) subject.30  
Channel 4’s Lifestyle programs further underwent a shift in the late 2000s. In the light of a review of 
public service broadcasting under the late Blair Government, Channel 4 sought to redress its role as 
public service provider. It had become overly commercial as a result of gaining control of its own 
advertising time in 1993, and because it refocused its main target group towards a young, affluent and 
urban audience with programs such as Big Brother.31 By 2009 it also became clear that it needed to find 
alternative revenue streams as audiences splintered in the multi-channel era.32 Channel 4 saw the 
review as an opportunity to increase public service programs, which included quality drama, but also 
documentary. Within this climate, Channel 4 also remodelled many of its Lifestyle programs to fit the 
more caring, and clearly educational mould it aimed to achieve as a whole. These included programs 
such as How to Look Good Naked (Channel 4, 2006-2008), which emphasised body consciousness as a 
socio-cultural issue, rather than constructing it as a matter of “bad taste” as with What Not to Wear 
(BBC, 2001-2007). Supersize versus Superskinny (Channel 4, since 2008) investigates the medical and 
socio-psychological issues that accompany dietary choices. Superscrimpers (Channel 4, since 2011) is 
constructed in response to the financial crisis of 2007/8, by offering domestic and local money saving 
advice. These contemporary Lifestyle programs can also be read as masculinised, not least because of 
the use of male experts who have replaced the female presenters of earlier versions of the genre (Gok 
Wan instead of Trinny and Susannah, Dr. Christian Jenssen instead of Gillian McKeith). They also offer a 
particular appeal to the audience as both discerning and culturally or socially aware – offering a sort of 
public service Lifestyle genre, and in so doing re-imagining the public along lines of public policy and 
economics.  It is within this context that Jamie’s School Dinners set a remarkable example. 
 
Jamie’s School Dinners 
Jamie’s School Dinners is at the forefront of this most recent shift in Channel 4’s broadcasting. Indeed, it 
clearly influenced and shaped the public service agenda that has been reimagined and reproduced in the 
particular ways noted above. These changes are also evident in the social and civic premise that the 
program pertains to have. Labelled “documentary” rather than Lifestyle, it re-imagines cooking as an 
issue of national importance related to health, wellbeing, education, and family values. It also re-
positions cooking as an activity about which we need to be educated, rather than simply entertained. Of 
course, such claims also draw on the many discourses of youth as needing protection, as problematic, 
and as inherently different from previous generations.33 By focusing on children and school dinners, 
Jamie’s School Dinners works with the potent device of power imbalance which positions the viewer in a 
powerful role, which mirrors some of the earlier hierarchies discussed above even if they are here less 
clearly structured around class (though this features too as we will see later). Within this context, 
Oliver’s public persona is also deliberately re-written, from “new lad” and chef to caring father and 
citizen who acts as (literally) paternalistic individual.  
In addition to the paternalistic stance of early public service broadcasting, the program also rehashes a 
deliberately national address. These are “our children” – the children of the nation – whom we are all 
called upon to care for, along with the campaign leader, Oliver. Moreover, it develops the educational 
content of the documentary into a political campaign, which the nation is called upon to join (for 
example, by “taking action” via an online petition which resulted in over 270,000 signatures).34 As 
viewers, we are also offered characters with whom to identify, be that the school dinner cook and 
reluctant campaigner, Nora Sands, or (more likely) the parents who are shown again and again being 
addressed by Oliver in his crusade to find potential political allies. Eventually, this campaign, which we 
see unfold over four weeks, leads Oliver to the prime minister, where Oliver delivers the votes of the 
online petition. Of course, this understanding of “our children” and the viewer as citizen is based on an 
extremely porous premise. The assumption is that this is an issue in which everyone has some 
investment - even if we need to be educated about what exactly is happening in “our” schools to be able 
to create change in terms of policy and perception. 
Despite these overt political and civic elements of the program, it nevertheless operates within the 
Lifestyle genre and its neoliberal agenda. This is perhaps most apparent in the way Nora is presented. 
Like any other subject of Lifestyle television, she is as a woman in need of a makeover. In this case, this 
makeover relates to her attitudes towards freshly cooked dinners. Accustomed to re-heating pre-cooked 
and packaged food, Nora is at first reluctant to embrace Oliver’s fresh food campaign. Instead, she 
complains about the amount of time and work the preparations take, and again when she doesn’t 
receive the recipes in writing but is instead expected to write them down herself. She whines when she 
doesn’t know what she will cook the next day. It is only later, when she convinces other dinner ladies, 
that her “progress” is revealed. Her attitudes to fresh food, as well as her white cooking uniform which 
includes an unflattering hat (a uniform she is allowed to take off when she joins the campaign trail) and 
her noticeable regional accent, clearly mark her as different from the middle-class celebrity cook, Oliver. 
Instead she is strongly coded as working class in need of improvement. In that respect, she is aligned 
with the parents who pass banned junk food to their children through the school fences. This 
representation invites the audience to position themselves as middle class, discerning and 
knowledgeable, a position which, as commentators35 have shown, is squarely in line with one key 
convention of Lifestyle television. Indeed, Biressi and Nunn argue that makeover programs allow 
viewers “to explore the hierarchies of social difference and to review their own relative position within 
them”.36 In this context, then, the viewers are again framed as neoliberal subjects, in charge of their 
own destinies. The main difference of course, relates to the overt political and civic messages the 
program also claims.  
Jamie’s School Dinners, then, precisely articulates a public which is both defined by traditional and 
contemporary understandings of public service broadcasting. It marries the paternalistic and classist 
approach which imagines the viewing public as one nation with the “post-1980s ascendancy of the 
political values of consumerism, choice and individual self-reliance”.37 The public sphere becomes 
defined by the citizens’ ability to take control and participate – as long as they can firstly transform 
themselves to adhere to the middle-class values that are presented as commonsensical. 
 
The American Remake 
The problematic definition of the public in Jamie’s School Dinners is further undermined when it is 
compared with the American remake. Before we can investigate the re-import’s impact on the meanings 
of the original, it is important to gain a better understanding of the American version. Jamie’s American 
Food Revolution, in contrast to the British version, is not addressed to a nation as a whole. Instead, it is 
focused on specific individuals and a particular locale. The latter is evident in the opening lines spoken 
by Ryan Seacrest: “beautiful Huntington, West Virginia, population fifty thousand, home of Marshall 
University, and recently named – the unhealthiest city in America.” This address is accompanied by 
images of the city’s sights, including a “welcome to Huntington” sign, the University, the city centre, 
before cutting to images of unhealthy food, obese people on the streets and in doctors’ surgeries: 
images which we will encounter again later in the program when they will be contextualised in small-
scale narratives about specific individuals. To compare this briefly with Jamie’s School Dinners, in the 
original series, Oliver appears in an educational environment, pictured showing children different 
vegetables before sitting amongst them while they eat their lunches. He addresses the camera directly, 
with the sound of the school environment nearly drowning him out, suggesting a direct cinema 
documentary style. When the sound is faded out and Timothy Spall begins his narration, the emphasis is 
on “school dinners” and again “our children”, indicating that this is a general problem that the nation as 
a whole has to deal with, rather than a specific town.  
Jamie’s American Food Revolution is also about specific people – not least Oliver himself. He is 
introduced as the “one man [who] will be trying to save 50,000 lives.” In contrast, in the British version, 
he appears as someone who tries to take on the role of government, since “they don’t seem to have the 
answers.” This sets up two very different personas for Oliver. In the American version, he appears as 
single-handed saviour who is on a near-impossible mission; in the British, he is a concerned citizen and 
father doing his civic duty. The opening of the American version also introduces what Seacrest calls 
“resistance”, embodied in the two very specific figures of the radio DJ and one outspoken dinner lady, 
Alice, a more extreme version of Nora, clearly set up to mirror her. More importantly, in the British 
version Nora is representative of a general, and noticeably plural “dinner ladies” although she does 
visually dominate the introductory scenes. In the American version, Alice is constructed as an individual 
problem – as part of the “resistance”.  As a result of this individualisation, the public and civic 
framework falters and the overt political aim becomes negated, and – considering the apparent scale of 
the mission – also less possible. 
How individualised this mission actually is becomes apparent in the very first scene after the 
introductory section. Here, the local radio DJ, Rod Willis, states in the language of liberal America: “I 
really take issue with someone coming in and telling us how we should live our lives.” The argument of 
individual responsibility versus Oliver’s (and Britain’s more general) paternalistic stance is staged in the 
radio debate and post-interviews, when Willis accuses Oliver of grandee-ism.38 Of course this mirrors an 
age-old discourse of cultural difference between the two countries that is problematic at best.39 By 
staging this opposition as a fight (heated up in the post-debate interviews with Willis and Oliver), the 
program aims not only to create the suitable tension to keep viewers entertained (and note the absence 
of this extreme staging in the British version), but places the viewers in a position where they have to 
choose clearly defined sides – with the aim, of course, that they will be swayed – as Willis will be – 
towards Oliver’s. 
In sum, such a staging of oppositions, locales and individuals means that Oliver’s paternalistic campaign 
can be cloaked in the guise of neoliberal choice. The US program presents choices and perspectives 
constructed as dichotomous for the individual viewer. In turn, this means that the program is completely 
divorced from a collective address that defines groups of people (such as dinner ladies, parents, policy 
makers and finally the audience as a whole), from which policy and thereby a definition of the public as 
the nation can be extrapolated. Instead, even the viewers are defined as individuals, free to choose (and 
invited to choose). In order to make the argument compelling, the program also needs to develop 
Oliver’s and the other characters as characters. Their behaviour becomes stereotyped and – with the 
help of carefully crafted editing and decisions on the part of the participants, particularly Oliver, Alice 
and Willis – their behaviour also becomes performative. Oliver renders this visible by frequently 
emphasising that he is performing a role – be that of the apprentice on his first day in the school, of the 
“polite Brit” who comes to America, or the concerned father who dresses up in a pea costume to make 
his teachings to the kids more fun.40 The program, then, is not a civic call to action, as the British one 
claimed, but a showcasing of Oliver’s variable (star) persona as well as the creation of new stars (in 
particular Alice) in the name of neoliberal debate, conducted for the entertainment of (perhaps) 
politically aware, individual viewers. 
 
Conclusions  
What is particularly notable for us is that the differences between the British and American version only 
become visible through the re-import of the program to Channel 4. Sitting between similar Lifestyle 
programs, the re-import draws attention to the problematic framing of the original “documentary” and 
in the process, undermines its public service function more generally. In particular, it makes visible the 
contradictions, discussed below, that are heightened in the American remake, but contained in the 
British version too.  
Oliver’s performance is self-consciously and self-reflexively foregrounded in the American remake, 
which in turn throws into question the authenticity of Oliver’s “passion” in the British original. By 
comparison, Oliver comes across as relatively understated, but the narrative in both versions is so 
similar that his emotional reactions are betrayed as narratively motivated and hence inevitably 
performed. As a result, a level of fakery creeps into the experience of the original version which 
undermines its value as public service. Public service, then, must be authentic, non-replicable or, at 
least, not performing. 
The re-import to Britain, on a much more fundamental level, also makes visible its commercial value. 
Rather than being a campaign designed to change the national public, the series becomes a commodity, 
to be traded for financial gain. That British programs are internationally successful as formats is not 
news to a British viewing public.41 However, the commercial exploitation emphasises the monetary 
value of the program, there to enhance Oliver’s business empire, which by 2005 included a restaurant, 
TV series, books and advertising contracts. This is also related to the notion of authenticity, raising issues 
around notions of “unique” television versus the “mass produced”42 – which the commercial 
exploitation via the format trade explicitly introduces.  
The program’s international value also undermines its specific national public service value. If we are 
addressed as a nation, how can the exact same issue be of relevance to just one locale elsewhere? What 
this question suggests is that for public service television to work, it must indeed speak to a particular 
public and not – at the same time – to others. In the case of Jamie’s School Dinners this public was, as 
we have seen, very clearly defined as national.  
As a result of the above, the series also becomes less issue based. Within the British context, the 
porosity of the school dinner narrative in which supposedly everyone is invested (be that for nostalgic or 
parental or public policy reasons) becomes increasingly obvious. Because everyone can engage with the 
narrative, it seems self-sufficient when seen only in the British context. But as soon as the American 
version is played back to us, this sentiment is lost as we gape at the bizarre American eating habits and 
political opinions, and because we are constantly aligned with individuals rather than publics. As a 
result, the narrative in both versions becomes less about the issues and more about the hero Jamie 
Oliver. 
Overall, then,  the re-import of the program highlights the fact that our own versions are actually far less 
issue based, less public service focused, less authentic, more hero centred and more commercially 
interested than we would like to admit. In part this stems from the normative viewing conditions that 
structure our reception and make these issues less visible for us. However, they are also better disguised 
in a British context that wants to operate as a public service. Seeing the American remake, then, creates 
the critical distance that uncloaks both the representational disguises and our normative perceptual 
habits. 
This, of course, also has implications for our understanding of public service and the public more 
generally. Indeed, it unmasks the hidden and complex notion that we have of public service 
broadcasting. Thus, unlike Scannell who was able to return to broadcasting reports that clearly defined 
what the term should imply, we are struck by just how intangible the concept has become. The 
contradictions that the remake of the program makes visible suggest that public service broadcasting 
should be addressed to a specific public (and only to that), should be authentic (but what in an era of 
postmodern performativity might that be?), should not be commercial (but perhaps it can be in Britain), 
and should be issue based (but who defines what counts as an issue?). Perhaps even less tangible is the 
fact that it should be connected to a particular address (that draws us in as citizens who might be able to 
take “action”) and to a particular, but badly defined, experience of viewing. What all of this indicates is 
that the notion of “the public” is emotive, and a lived and embodied experience which, for British 
viewers, decreasingly operates as a clear agenda. 
Jamie’s School Dinners and its American remake, then, make visible the problem that public service 
broadcasting in the post-Peacock era faces. If it is defined by particular programs, such as this one which 
we have dubbed an example of public service Lifestyle, then it suffers from a lack of clear 
understandings of its component parts, and most of all “the public” itself. As long as it remains an 
emotive notion that needs to operate within a commercial system (in which programs need to be 
exploited via the format trade, for example), it can all too easily be unmasked as performed, 
inauthentic, not issue based and, most of all, not really addressed to us – the viewing nation as public. 
With this specific (and last) bastion of public service broadcasting pulled from under us like the 
proverbial rug, the ideal of public service television turns into a falling house of cards. 
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